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Abstract 
The US has experienced a sustained increase in productivity growth since the mid-1990s, particularly in sectors 
that intensively use information technologies (IT). This has not occurred in Europe. If the US “productivity 
miracle” is due to a natural advantage of being located in the US then we would not expect to see any evidence 
of it for US establishments located abroad. This paper shows in fact that US multinationals operating in the UK 
do have higher productivity than non-US multinationals in the UK, and this is primarily due to the higher 
productivity of their IT. Furthermore, establishments that are taken over by US multinationals increase the 
productivity of their IT, whereas observationally identical establishments taken over by non-US multinationals 
do not. One explanation for these patterns is that US firms are organized in a way that allows them to use new 
technologies more efficiently. A model of endogenously chosen organizational form and IT is developed to 
explain these new micro and macro findings. 
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AMERICANS DO I.T. BETTER: 
US MULTINATIONALS AND THE PRODUCTIVITY MIRACLE 
 
Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen
∗
 
 
Unlike Europe, US productivity accelerated after 1995, particularly in sectors that intensively use 
information technologies (IT).  Using two new micro panel datasets we show that  US 
multinationals operating in Europe also experienced a “productivity miracle”. US multinationals 
obtained higher productivity from IT than non  US multinationals, particularly in sectors 
responsible for the US productivity acceleration. Furthermore, establishments taken over by US 
multinationals (but not non US multinationals) increased the productivity of their IT. Combining 
pan-European firm-level IT data with our management practices survey, we find that the US IT 
related productivity advantage is primarily due to its tougher “people management” practices.  
(JEL O47, F23, E22, O3)  
 
One of the most startling economic facts of recent years  has been the reversal in the long-
standing catch-up of Europe’s productivity level with the United  States. American labor 
productivity growth slowed after the early 1970s Oil Shocks but accelerated sharply after 1995. 
Although European productivity growth experienced the same slowdown, it has not enjoyed the 
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same rebound (see Figure 1)
1
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
. For example, Robert Inklaar, Marcel Timmer and Bart van Ark 
(2008) show that US GDP per hour growth accelerated from 1.3  percent  1980-1995 to 2.2 
percent  1995-2006, whereas in Europe productivity growth slowed from 2.3  percent  to 1.4 
percent. Although some part of the observed European slowdown may be due to labor market 
reforms getting less skilled workers into jobs, most analysts agree there was still a substantial gap 
in productivity growth between the US and EU that has persisted. Nor has the recent recession 
changed this picture: US productivity growth appears to have continued to outstrip that in Europe 
(Robert Gordon 2010). 
Decompositions of US productivity growth show that a large fraction of this recent 
growth occurred in those sectors that either produce IT (information technologies) or intensively 
use IT. Closer analysis has shown that European countries had a similar productivity acceleration 
as the US in IT producing sectors (such as semi conductors and computers) but failed to achieve 
the spectacular levels of productivity growth in the sectors that used  IT intensively - 
predominantly market service sectors, including wholesale, retail and financial services (e.g. van 
Ark,  Mary  O’Mahony and Timmer 2008).  In the light of the credit crunch, the measured 
productivity gains in finance may prove illusory - which is why we focus on non financial firms 
in the paper - but the productivity gains in other sectors like retail and wholesale are likely to be 
real and persistent. Consistent with these trends, Figure 2 shows that IT intensity appears to be 
substantially higher in the US than Europe and this gap has not narrowed over time. Given the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical  data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the 
interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. 
1 Examples of early studies include Dale Jorgenson (2001) and Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel (2000). Looking at more recent 
data, Jorgenson, Mun Ho and Kevin Stiroh (2008) document that average annual US labor productivity growth was similar in the 
2000-2006 period to the 1995-2000 period (and well above the 1.5 percent of 1973-1995). Only after 2005 is their any sign of a 
return to more “normal” levels of productivity growth as IT prices declines have slowed.   3 
common availability of IT throughout the world at broadly similar prices, it is a major puzzle 
why these IT related productivity effects have not been more widespread in Europe. 
There are at least two broad classes of explanation for this puzzle. First, there may be 
some “natural advantage” to being located in the US, enabling firms to make better use of the 
opportunity that comes from rapidly falling IT prices. These natural advantages could be tougher 
product market competition, lower regulation, better access to risk capital, more educated
2 or 
younger workers, larger market size, greater geographical space, or a host of other factors. A 
second class of explanations stresses that it is not the US environment per se that matters but 
rather the way that  US firms are managed  that enables  better exploitation of IT  (“the US 
management hypothesis”)
3
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. In this paper we sketch a model that has 
elements of both (see Appendix B and Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen 
2007). Nevertheless, one straightforward way to test whether the US management hypothesis has 
any validity is to examine the IT performance of US owned organizations in a European 
environment.  If  US multinationals partially transfer  their business models to their overseas 
affiliates– and a walk into McDonald’s or Starbucks anywhere in Europe suggests that this is not 
an unreasonable assumption –  then analyzing the IT performance of US multinational 
establishments in Europe should be informative. Finding a systematically better use of IT by 
American firms outside the US suggests that we should take the US management hypothesis 
seriously. Such a test could not be easily performed only with data on plants located in the US 
. 
                                                            
2 For example, if IT is complementary with human capital, then the larger stock of college educated workers in the US than 
Europe may mean that productivity grows faster in the US when IT prices are falling rapidly. 
3 Another possibility is international differences in productivity measurement (Olivier Blanchard 2004). This is possible, but the 
careful work of O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003) focusing on the same sectors in the US and EU, using common adjustments for 
hedonic prices, software capitalization and demand conditions, still find a difference in US-EU relative productivity growth rates.   4 
because any findings of higher efficiency of plants owned by US multinationals might arise 
because of the advantage of operating on the multinational’s home turf (“home bias”)
4
In this paper,  we  examine  the differences in IT  related  productivity between 
establishments owned by US multinationals, establishments owned by non US multinationals and 
purely domestic establishments. We exploit two distinct rich and original panel datasets. The first 
is from the UK Census Bureau (the Office of National Statistics, ONS) and contains over 11,000 
establishments. The UK is a useful testing ground because (a) it has extensive foreign ownership 
with frequent ownership changes and (b) the UK Census Bureau has collected panel data on IT 
expenditure and productivity in both manufacturing and services since the mid-1990s.  The 
second dataset is a firm-level panel covering seven European countries and combines our own 
international survey of management practices, a private sector IT survey and company accounting 
data. Although this European dataset is smaller, the use of observable measures of management 
practices allows a more direct test of the theory. 
. 
We report that foreign affiliates of US multinationals appear to obtain higher productivity 
than non US multinationals (and domestic firms) from their IT capital and are also more IT 
intensive. This is true in both the UK establishment-level dataset and the European firm-level 
dataset.  These findings are robust to a number of tests,  including  an  examination of 
establishments before and after they are taken over by a US multinational compared to those 
taken over by a non US multinational. Using our new international management practices dataset 
we then show that American firms have higher scores on “people management” practices defined 
in terms of promotions, rewards, hiring and firing
5
                                                            
4 Mark Doms and Bradford Jensen (1998) find that plants owned by US multinationals have higher productivity than non US 
multinationals. But since this study was based only on located in the US, it could just be a reflection of home bias. 
. This holds true for both domestically based 
US firms as well as US multinationals operating in Europe. Using our European firm-level panel   5 
we find these management practices account for most of the higher output elasticity of IT of US 
firms. This appears to be because people management practices enable US firms to exploit IT 
better.  
Our paper is related to several other literatures. First, there is a large body of work on the 
impact of IT on productivity at the aggregate or industry-level
6.  Second,  there is growing 
evidence that the returns to IT are linked to the internal organization of firms. On the econometric 
side,  Eve  Caroli and Van Reenen (2001),  Tim  Bresnahan,  Erik  Brynjolfsson and Lorin  Hitt 
(2002)  and  Gustavo  Crespi,  Chiara  Criscuolo and Jonathan  Haskel (2006) find that internal 
organization and other complementary factors, such as human capital, are important in generating 
significant returns to IT. On the case study side, there is also a large range of evidence
7. Third, in 
a reversal of the Solow Paradox, the firm-level productivity literature describes returns to IT that 
are  larger  than one would expect under the standard growth accounting assumptions. 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) argue that this is due to complementary investments in 
“organizational capital” that are reflected in the coefficients on IT capital. Fourth, there is a 
literature on the superior establishment-level productivity of US multinationals versus non US 
multinationals, both in the US and in other countries
8
                                                                                                                                                                                            
5 It is plausible that higher scores reflect “better” management, but we do not assume this. All we claim is that American firms 
have different people management practices than European firms, and these are complementary with IT. 
. We suggest that the main reason for this 
difference is the way in which US multinationals use new technologies more effectively than 
other multinationals. Finally,  our  paper  is  linked  to the literature on multinationals and 
comparative advantage. A recent body of theoretical work emphasizes the importance of firm-
6 See, for example, Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinavasan (2003) and Kevin Stiroh (2002, 2004). 
7 Blanchard et al. (2002) discuss a number of industry-specific examples. George Baker and Thomas Hubbard (2004) is an 
excellent example of applying econometric techniques to a case study of on-board computers in the US trucking industry. 
8 See, for example, Doms and Jensen (1998) on US plants, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin and Thorsten Schank (2003) on German 
plants, Criscuolo and Ralf Martin (2005) on British plants and Luigi Benfratello and Alessandro Sembenelli (2006) on Italian 
plants.   6 
level comparative advantage in multinationals
9
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section I describes the empirical framework, the 
UK establishment-level data is described in Section II and the results from this panel are 
presented in Section III. The European firm-level data is described in Section IV and the results 
from  this panel are presented in Section V. Section VI  offers some concluding remarks. 
Appendices are all available on the AER website.  
. In these models firms have some productivity 
advantage, which their multinationals transplant to their overseas affiliates. Our evidence on the 
systematically different people management practices of US overseas affiliates provides 
empirical support for this assumption. Interestingly, these results are also consistent with the 
literature reporting that US multinationals appear to be earning extremely high rates of return 
abroad from intangible capital (“dark  matter”), particularly since the mid 1990s (e.g. Ellen 
McGrattan and Edward  Prescott 2008). Our results suggest one factor could be that the 
management practices of US multinationals enable them to more effectively use of IT. 
 
I. Empirical Modelling Strategy 
We sketch our basic modelling strategy with more formal details in Appendix B. Here, sub-
section A describes the basic approach, sub-section B describes the equations we can estimate 
when we do not directly observe management practices, as is standard in most economic datasets 
(this is the case for our UK establishment-level panel). By contrast, sub-section C describes the 
equations we are able to estimate when we do directly observe management practices (this can be 
implemented on our pan-European firm-level panel).  
 
                                                            
9  For example, Elhanan  Helpman,  Marc  Melitz and Stephen  Yeaple (2004), Pol  Antras,  Luis  Garicano and Esteban  Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) and Ariel Burstein and Alexander Monge (2009).   7 
A. Basic Empirical Model 
Consider the following production function:  
 
(1)     
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where Q denotes gross output of establishment (or firm) i in year t. A is a Hicks-neutral efficiency 
term,  M  denotes materials/intermediate inputs, L  denotes labor, K  denotes non  IT capital,  C 
denotes computer/IT capital and O is a measure of the firms’ management/organizational capital 
that is complementary with IT capital. This specification of the production function in equation 
(1) is a simple way of capturing the notion that IT (C) and management (O) are complementary if 
σ > 0 (Bresnahan et al. 2002). Equation (1) should be regarded as an approximation of a more 
flexible production function: we examine these more general production functions (such as the 
translog) in the empirical section and show that equation (1) is consistent with the empirical 
results
10
1 } , , , , { 0 ≤ + − ≤
O M K C L O O α α α σ α σ α
. We assume that all the exponents on the factor inputs are bounded by zero and unity to 
make sure the firm’s optimization problem is well behaved 
(i.e. ). This means the value of σ , 
L α  and 
C α  are 
dependent on the scaling of O, so that for example doubling the units on O would halve the units 
on σ . Note that 
O α could be equal to zero, so that increasing O would have no direct effect on 
firm output. Finally, we will generally consider O to be fixed in the short run (sub-section D 
relaxes this assumption). 
                                                            
10 A more flexible translog production relationship would be:  
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where a superscript denotes a factor input so 
L X = L = labor, etc. The second term on the right hand side of this equation 
contains the term ln(X
O)*ln(X
C), the interaction between management and IT, which we find to be crucial in the empirical work.    8 
We use lower case letters to indicate that a variable is transformed into natural logarithms, 
so it it Q q ln ≡ , etc., and consider parameterizing the establishment-specific efficiency in equation 
(1) as  it kt it i it u z a a + + + = ξ γ'  where z are other observable factors influencing productivity – 
e.g. establishment age, region and whether the establishment is part of a multi-plant group. The 
kt ξ  are industry-time specific shocks that we will control for with a full set of three-digit industry 
(k) dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies
11
 
. Under these assumptions, equation (1) 
can be written: 
(2) 
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Note that we choose to normalize on labor as this makes it straightforward to test for constant 
returns by examining whether the coefficient on labor in equation (2) is significantly different 
from zero.  In Appendix C and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007) we consider the non 
normalized version (as in footnote 10) showing similar results. 
Another implication of the idea that IT capital is complementary with specific types of 
management practices is that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher levels of O will have a greater 
demand for IT capital. We consider the IT intensity equation
12
 
: 
(3)  it kt it h it
O
it e w O l c + + + = − ς ϕ β ' ) (  
 
                                                            
11 We also experimented with year-specific four digit dummies and explicit measures of output prices (up to the five-digit level) 
which generated very similar results to our baseline model with year-specific three-digit industry dummies. 
12 This is a first-order approximation to the non linear factor demand equation (B7) for IT in Appendix B where the factor prices 
are common across firms in an industry for a given year. If σ  > 0 then
O β  >  0.   9 
where  it w  are controls,  kt ς  are the industry-time shocks,  it e  is an error term and we expect 
O β  to 
be positive under complementarity of IT and O. It is worth noting that the estimates of equation 
(2) and (3) embody alternative identification assumptions. For example, assume that there is 
exogenous variation in  i O   across firms, but no exogenous variation in IT capital. 
Complementarity will imply that the factor demand equation for IT is a positive, but 
deterministic function of  i O . Thus, equations of the form of (3) are useful to identify 
complementarity. By contrast, it will not be possible to identify the coefficient on IT capital (nor 
σ , the coefficient on its interaction with  i O ) in the production function because IT capital has no 
firm-level variation conditional on  i O . In practice, however, the production function coefficients 
can be identified from adjustment costs or shocks to IT capital arising from falling prices and 
optimization errors (see Appendix C). But examining the IT demand equation is a useful cross 
check on these results. 
A key idea in this paper is that 
DOM MNE USA O O O > > , where 
USA O  is the mean level of 
management in US firms, 
MNE O , the mean level in non US multinationals and 
DOM O , the mean 
level in domestic firms. We describe below two different empirical strategies to test this 
hypothesis, which vary according to the availability of data on O. 
 
B. Testing the Model when O is unobserved 
Basic  Production Function  - When O is unobserved, given its complementarity with IT, we 
expect to see systematic differences in the elasticity of output with respect to IT  capital  in 
equation (2) between US and other firms. In order to test this hypothesis we estimate the 
following production function for different sectors (e.g. IT intensive and non IT intensive)
13
                                                            
13 In the robustness section we estimate equation (4) separately across different two and three digit industries. 
   10 
(4)    
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where 
USA
it D
 denotes that the establishment is owned by a US firm in year t and 
MNE
it D  denotes 
that the establishment is owned by a non US multinational enterprise (the omitted base is that the 
establishment belongs to a non multinational domestic firm denoted “DOM”
14
DOM C MNE C USA C , , , ˆ ˆ ˆ α α α > >
). If our model is 
correct then empirically when we estimate equation (4) we should find 
, i.e. a greater productivity effect of IT in US multinationals than non 
US multinationals or domestic establishments
15 ,, ˆˆ
C MNE C DOM αα > . Note that the final inequality ( ) 
is less of a clean test as domestic firms may be quite different from multinationals on a number of 
dimensions, whereas non  US multinationals are a more credible “control group” for US 
multinationals. A related hypothesis is that US multinationals are more productive that non US 
multinationals and domestic firms, i.e.  
,, , , , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ () () ()
C USA C USA C MNE C MNE C DOM C DOM
it it it cl cl cl δα δ α δ α + −> + −> + −. This has to be 
evaluated at a particular level of IT intensity, but since the overall mean of ln(C/L) is close to 
zero, a test of the equality of the multinational dummies is presented at the base of every table. 
 
                                                            
14 We could not reject the hypothesis that UK multinationals had the same productivity and output elasticity of IT capital as other 
non US multinationals.  
15 A more general form of the production function is one where we allow all the factor inputs (
J
it x ) to differ by ownership status: 
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Note, that although we will estimate this equation in some specifications, empirically the interactions between the non IT factor 
inputs and ownership status are not significantly different from zero. The one interaction that does stand out is between the US 
ownership dummy and IT capital: the coefficient on IT capital is significantly higher for US establishments than for other 
multinationals or domestic establishments. We also cannot reject the hypothesis that all ownership types have the same return to 
scale parameter so we generally impose this.   11 
Another implication of the idea that US firms have an advantage in the use of IT is that, ceteris 
paribus, they will have a greater demand for IT capital. Consequently we estimate the IT intensity 
equation equivalent to equation (3): 
 
(5)  it kt it
MNE
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Where  it w  are controls,  kt ς  the industry-time shocks and  it e  is an error term. The hypothesis of 
interest is, of course, whether 0
USA MNE ββ >>  with a focus on the first inequality (
USA MNE ββ > ).  
 
Since the significance of the US*ln(C/L) interaction (the 
, C USA α  coefficient in equation (4)) may 
capture unobservable factors beyond managerial differences, we perform an extensive range of 
tests to check the robustness of our results. These are detailed below. 
Sub-sample of establishments who are taken over  -  One concern with our empirical 
strategy is that US firms may “cherry pick” the establishments with the highest IT productivity. 
This would generate a higher IT coefficient for American firms, but this would only be due to 
positive selection. To tackle this issue we focus on a sub-sample of UK establishments that have 
been taken over at some point in the sample period. Prior to the takeover we find no evidence of 
differential coefficients on IT in establishments subsequently targeted by US firm versus non US 
firms. But after the takeover we find that establishments acquired by US firms have significantly 
higher IT productivity than those taken over by other firms.  
Unobserved Heterogeneity - In all specifications, we choose a general structure of the 
error term that allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation over time. But, there 
could still be establishment-specific unobserved heterogeneity. So, we also generally include a 
full set of establishment-level fixed effects (the “within-groups” estimator). The fixed-effects   12 
estimators are more demanding, as there may be many unobservable omitted variables correlated 
with IT that generate an upwards bias for the coefficient on IT capital.  
One aspect of unobserved heterogeneity is establishment-specific prices which will not be 
fully controlled for by the fixed effects and the industry dummies interacted with time dummies 
(see Lucia Foster, Haltiwanger and Chad Syverson, 2008). Empirically, the dependent variable in 
equation (4) is revenue not physical units, so we are estimating “revenue productivity” equations 
rather than physical productivity equations and we should interpret the coefficients on the factor 
inputs as reflecting both the technological parameters and a mark-up term.  
To investigate this we will estimate the “revenue productivity function” allowing for 
monopolistic competition following Tor Klette and Zvi Griliches (1996) and Jan De Loecker 
(2007). Essentially this implies including additional terms for four digit output interacted by 
ownership type to the empirical analogue of equation (4). Note, however, differential mark-ups 
for American firms cannot easily explain  one of our findings that the coefficient on IT  is 
significantly larger for US firms but the other factor coefficients appear to be the same across 
multinationals types. If US firms are able to command a higher output price for IT capital this is 
consistent with the idea that IT improves quality (rather than simply increasing output) by more 
for American multinationals than other multinationals. This higher IT related quality would be 
reflected in a firm-specific higher mark-up for IT intensive US firms. This is consistent with our 
theoretical story. 
Endogeneity of the Factor Inputs - We take several approaches to check the robustness of 
our results to the endogeneity issue, accepting that there is no “magic bullet” to this problem 
which is still an active area of econometric research (see Daniel Ackerberg et al. 2008, for a 
survey). In particular, we present results using a version of the Olley-Pakes estimator (1996) 
allowing for multiple capital inputs, and the “System GMM” estimator of Richard Blundell and   13 
Steve Bond (1998, 2000). In both cases we find a much higher IT coefficient for US firms in the 
production function. We also present IT intensity equations derived from the first-order 
conditions of the model and find that US firms have significantly higher IT capital intensities 
than other firms, especially in the IT intensive sectors. 
Heterogeneity in the coefficients by industry - We allow for considerable heterogeneity by 
including fixed effects and industry effects interacted with time dummies. But the fact that the 
gap in US-EU productivity growth is so concentrated in the so-called “IT intensive sectors” 
suggests breaking down the regression estimates along these lines. We follow exactly the same 
classification as Stiroh (2002) to divide our sample into those which intensively use IT versus the 
rest of the sample (he based these on the flow of IT services in total capital services). These are 
predominantly service sectors such as wholesale, retail and business services, but also include 
several manufacturing sectors such as printing and publishing (see Table A1). We interpret this 
sectoral breakdown as indicating which sectors in Europe have the greatest potential (i.e. highest 
σ)  to benefit from IT  enabled innovations if firms are able to adopt  the appropriate 
complementary organizational practices
16. Blanchard (2004) and Blanchard et al. (2002) give 
many examples of these from various in-depth case studies. One could argue, for example, 
whether or not Stiroh was correct in classifying retail in the IT intensive sector or not, but this is 
beside the point - retail is a sector that had fast productivity growth in the US post 1995 and 
Europe did not. Our hypothesis is that part of this difference was due to different management 
practices which enabled US retailers to efficiently exploit IT enabled innovations in retail
17
                                                            
16  We think this division is most appropriate as it does not rely on our subjective judgement. We consider other sectoral 
breakdowns such as using the industry level IT services share in Europe rather than the US and the IT to value added ratio. We 
obtain similar results from this. We also looked at a finer level of disaggregation by industry (such as splitting out retail and 
wholesale – see Section III). 
. If 
that was the case, than estimating equation (4) by different industry sectors should reveal a much   14 
stronger US*ln(C/L) interaction in the “IT intensive sectors” than the other industries. We also go 
further estimating the productions functions separately by each two digit sector, in particular 
breaking down the IT intensive sector into sub-industries such as retail and wholesale. 
 
C. Testing the Model using Direct Measurement of Firm Management Practices 
A more direct way to test whether US firms have higher levels of O (i.e.
MNE USA O O > ) is to use 
explicit measures of management. For this purpose, we collected our own data on management 
practices based on the methodology in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). We empirically measure 
O by an index of the “people management” in the firm which combines indicators of best practice 
in hiring, promotions, pay, retention and removing under performers (see below and Appendix 
A). We focus on these people management aspects of firm organization because the econometric 
and case-study evidence suggest that these features are particularly important for IT. The 
successful deployment of IT requires substantial changes in the  way that employees work, 
including the ability to decentralize decision making so employees can experiment. High 
outcomes on our people management scores will reflect this
18
We show that this index of people management is higher in US multinationals than in non 
US multinationals (and domestic firms). In particular, US firms tend to be more aggressive in 
promoting and rewarding high performing workers and removing under performing workers
.  
19
                                                                                                                                                                                            
17 Retailing has shifted from a low tech industry focused on shifting boxes from producer to consumer to an industry whose main 
activity is trading information by matching goods to consumer demand on a near continuous basis, where IT is an integral part of 
this process.  
. 
18 For example, the organizational measure in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) covers six measures which relate to the 
way that employees are managed (three questions on team-work, two on decentralization over pace and methods of work and one 
on employee involvement). 
19 The econometric and case-study evidence suggest that these features of people management are particularly important for IT. 
The successful deployment of IT requires substantial changes in the way that employees’ work, which is highly intensive in 
people management. For example, Larry Hunter et al. (2001) describe how IT radically changed the organization of US banks in 
the 1980s. The introduction of ATMs substantially reduced the need for tellers. At the same time PCs allowed staff to locate on 
the bank floor and directly sell customers mortgages, loans and insurance, replacing bank managers as the primary sales channel 
for these products. IT also enabled regional managers to remotely monitor branches. This led to a huge reduction in branch-level   15 
We combine the measures of people management with firm-level panel data from accounting 
information and an alternative source of IT data described below. Using this new European firm-
level panel database we estimate an augmented form of equation (4): 
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If our hypotheses is correct that the higher coefficient on IT in the production function for US 
multinationals is due to their management practices then we would predict that σ >0 and that 
USA C, α , the coefficient on the interaction between IT intensity and the US multinational dummy, 
it
USA D l c )] * ) [( − , would be insignificant once we condition on  )] * ) [( i it O l c− . We will show that 
this is indeed the case in our European panel dataset.  Note that this does not imply that 
management is unimportant without IT, nor that management only matters in certain sectors. 
Rather we are arguing these practices may be particularly important when combined with IT 
enabled innovations in the high productivity growth sectors of the “productivity miracle” period.  
 
D. Models of adjusting Management Practices  
To what extent does O change over time at the firm level? There is limited empirical evidence 
here, but many case studies suggest that management practices are difficult to change for 
incumbents. Micro-econometric studies of responses to external shocks such as deregulation (e.g. 
Olley and Pakes, 1996) or trade liberalization (e.g. Nina  Pavnik 2002) suggest that much 
aggregate change in productivity is driven by reallocation, entry and exit rather than simply 
incumbent plants increasing their productivity. Some theoretical models are built on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
management, and an extensive realignment of job responsibilities, major human-resources reorganization for senior bank 
managers. We discuss in more detail the empirical measures in the Data Section.   16 
assumption that the efficiency of establishments is fixed at birth (e.g. Boyan Jovanovic 1982; 
Melitz, 2003). So, in the short-run, the assumption of quasi-fixed management practices seems 
plausible and we exploit this in our estimation. 
In the longer-run, however, management practices are variable to some degree. Appendix 
B discusses some formal models where we allow management practices to be endogenously 
chosen by the firm. The first extension is to allow practices to be transferred when one firm takes 
over another firm. As with recent trade theory (e.g. Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) 
we assume that a multinational can transfer its management practices overseas (subject to some 
cost). This generates predictions of a distinctive dynamic pattern for the productivity-IT 
relationship for establishments taken over by US multinationals, which we find in the takeover 
sub-sample (see sub-section I.B above).   
Appendix B also discusses allowing management practices to be adjustable even for 
establishments which are not taken over (with and without adjustment costs) and shows that the 
key predictions are robust to this extension. We also discuss how our modelling structure relates 
to Basu et al. (2003) who also consider a formal model of productivity dynamics when there is 
complementarity between IT and organization
20
 
. 
II. Establishment-level Panel Data from the UK Census 
We use two main datasets in the paper which are drawn from several sources. A full description 
of the datasets appears in Appendix A. Both are original and have not been previously exploited 
in empirical work. The  first  is an original  UK establishment level panel constructed from 
combining multiple datasets within the UK Census Bureau. We present results from this data in 
                                                            
20 In Appendix B of Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007) we show how IT adjustment costs could help rationalize these TFP 
dynamics. See also Basu et al. (2003).   17 
Section III.  The second is a firm-level panel dataset across seven European countries. This 
combines our own survey of management  practices, an establishment-level  IT panel  and 
European firm-level accounting data. We describe the data in detail in Section IV and present the 
results in Section V. Both datasets are unbalanced panels – i.e. we do not condition on the sub-
sample of firms who are alive throughout the time period. 
The basis of the UK data is a panel of establishments covering all sectors of the UK 
private sector called the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). It does not include financial services, 
which is a virtue given the difficulty of measuring productivity in these sectors, as the financial 
crisis has amply demonstrated. It is similar in structure and content to the US Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD), and it  contains detailed information on revenues, investment, 
employment and material/intermediate inputs. However, unlike the US LRD it also covers the 
non manufacturing sector from the mid-1990s onwards. This is important, because the majority 
of the sectors responsible for the US productivity acceleration are outside manufacturing, such as 
retailing and wholesaling
21
We build IT capital stocks from IT expenditure flows using the perpetual inventory 
method and following Jorgenson (2001), keeping to US assumptions about depreciation rates and 
hedonic prices. We considered several experiments by changing our assumptions concerning the 
construction of the IT capital stock using alternative assumptions over depreciation rates and 
. We were also able to obtain access to several surveys of 
establishment-level IT expenditure conducted annually by the UK Census Bureau, which we then 
matched into the ABI using the establishment’s reference number. The dataset is unique in 
containing such a large sample of establishment-level longitudinal information on IT and 
productivity.  
                                                            
21 The new US Longitudinal Business Database includes services but does not have information on IT or non IT investment (see 
Davis et al. 2006).   18 
initial conditions
22
Our final dataset runs from 1995 through 2003, but there are many more observations 
after 1999. After cleaning, we are left with 21,746 observations with positive values for all the 
factor inputs. The results are robust to conditioning on three continuous time series observations 
per firm, but are weaker if we start conditioning on many more observations as we induce 
increasing amounts of selection bias. 
. Furthermore, we present results using an entirely different measure of IT 
usage based on the number of workers in the establishment who use computers (taken from a 
different survey, the E-Commerce Survey). Qualitatively similar results were obtained from all 
methods. 
There are many small and medium sized establishments in our sample
23 - the median 
establishment employs 238 workers. The establishments are larger than average for the UK 
economy because the sampling frames for the ABI and, in particular the IT surveys, deliberately 
over sample larger units. We did not find evidence that this causes any sample selection bias for a 
comparison of US multinational to non US multinationals
24
We have large numbers of multinational establishments in the sample. We can identify 
ownership using the Annual Foreign Direct Investment registry, which we also use to identify 
takeovers (from changes in ownership). About 8 percent of the establishments are US owned, 31 
. Average IT capital is about 1 percent 
of gross output at the unweighted mean (1.5 percent if weighted by size) or 2.5 percent of value 
added. These estimates are similar to the UK economy-wide means in Basu et al. (2003).  
                                                            
22 First, because there is uncertainty over the exact depreciation rate for IT capital, we experimented with a number of alternative 
values. Second, we do not know the initial IT capital stock for ongoing establishments the first time they enter the sample. Our 
baseline method is to impute the initial year’s IT stock using as a weight the establishment’s observed IT investment relative to 
the industry IT investment. An alternative is to assume that the plant’s share of the industry IT stock is the same as its share of 
employment in the industry. All methods gave similar results. 
23 Table A2 sets out the basic summary statistics of the sample. 
24 See sub-section A8 in Appendix A. There was some evidence that response rates were lower for small domestic firms, however, 
suggesting we have a disproportionate number of the larger domestic firms. Since these larger establishments are likely to be 
more productive, it will be harder to reject our hypothesis that domestic establishments have lower productivity than 
multinationals. Nevertheless, we are more confident in the comparison within the multinational set (i.e. US vs. non US) than 
between multinationals and domestic establishments.     19 
percent are owned by non US multinationals and 61 percent are purely domestic. Multinationals’ 
share of employment is even higher and their share of output higher still. Table 1 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the different types of ownership, all relative to the three-digit industry 
average. Labor productivity, as measured by output per employee, is 24 percent higher than 
average for US multinational establishments and 15 percent higher than average for non US 
multinational establishments. This suggests a nine percentage point productivity premium for US 
establishments as compared to other multinationals.  But US establishments also look 
systematically larger and more intensive in their non labor input usage than other multinationals. 
US establishments have 14 percentage points more employees, use about 8 percentage points 
more intermediate inputs per employee and 9  percentage points more non IT capital per 
employee than other multinationals. Most interesting for our purposes, though, the largest gap in 
factor intensity is for IT: US establishments are 32 percentage points more IT intensive than other 
multinationals. Hence, establishments owned by US multinationals are notably more IT intensive 
than other multinationals in the same industry.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
III. Results from the UK Establishment Panel 
A. Main Results  
In Table 2 we examine the output elasticity of IT in the standard production function framework 
described in Section II (these are all different implementations of equation (4)). Column (1) 
estimates the basic production function, including dummy variables for whether or not the plant 
is owned by a US multinational (“USA”) or a non US multinational (“MNE”) with domestic 
establishments being the omitted base. US establishments are 7.1 percent more productive than   20 
UK domestic establishments and non US multinationals are 3.9 percent more productive. This 3.2 
percent ( = 0.0712 - 0.0392) difference between the US and non US multinationals coefficients is 
also significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.021) as reported at the base of the column
25
[Table 2 about here] 
.  
The second column of Table 2 includes the IT capital measure. This enters positively and 
significantly and reduces the coefficients on the ownership dummies. US establishments are more 
IT intensive than other establishments, but this only accounts for about 0.2 percentage points of 
the initial 3.2 percent productivity gap between US and non US multinational establishments. 
Column (3) includes two interaction terms: one between IT capital and the US multinational 
dummy and the other between IT capital and the non US multinational dummy. These turn out to 
be very revealing. The interaction between the US dummy and IT capital is positive and 
significant at conventional levels. According to column (3) doubling the IT stock is associated 
with an increase in productivity of 6.3 percent (=0.0428 + 0.0202) for a US multinational but 
only 4.6 percent (=0.0428 + 0.0036) for a non US multinational. Note that non US multinationals 
are not significantly different from domestic UK establishments in this respect: we cannot reject 
the possibility that the coefficients on IT are equal for domestic UK establishments and non US 
multinationals. It is the US establishments that are distinctly different. The reported US*ln(C/L) 
interaction tests for significant differences in the output-IT elasticity between US multinationals 
and UK domestic establishments. The key test, however, is whether the IT coefficient for US 
multinationals is significantly different from the IT coefficient for other multinationals. The row 
at the bottom of Table 3 reports the p-value of tests on the equality between the US*ln(C/L) and 
                                                            
25 This implies that about two-thirds (6 percentage points of the 9 percentage point gap) of the observed labor productivity gap 
between US and other multinationals shown in Table 1 can be accounted for by our observables, such as greater non IT capital 
intensity in the US establishments, but a significant gap remains.   21 
the  MNE*ln(C/L)  coefficient  (i.e. Ho:
MNE C USA C , , α α = ),  showing that the coefficients are 
significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
[Table 3 about here] 
To investigate the industries that appear to account for the majority of the productivity 
acceleration in the US we split the sample into “IT using intensive sectors” in column (4) and 
“Other  sectors” in column (5). Sectors that use IT intensively account for most of the US 
productivity growth between 1995 and 2003. These include retail, wholesale, business services 
and hi-tech manufacturing like printing/publishing. The US interaction with IT capital is much 
stronger in the IT using sectors, and it is not significantly different from zero in the other sectors 
(even though we have twice as many observations in those industries). The final three columns 
include a full set of establishment fixed effects. The earlier pattern of results is repeated; in 
particular, column (7) demonstrates that US establishments appear to have a significantly higher 
coefficient on their IT capital stocks than other multinationals (and domestic firms)
26. A doubling 
of the IT capital stock is associated with 1.2 percent higher productivity for a domestic or non US 
multinational,  but  4.9  percent  higher productivity for an  establishment  owned by a US 
multinational
27
Quantification - The results in column (7) of Table 2 report a US coefficient on IT capital 
stock that is about 3.7 percent higher than for domestic firms or non US multinationals. Given 
that IT intensity over the period of 1995 to 2004 was rising at about 22 percent per year in both 
the US and EU  (Timmer and van Ark, 2005), this implies a faster growth rate of labor 
productivity of US establishments in the IT intensive sector of about 0.81 percentage points per 
.  
                                                            
26 We were also concerned that the IT interaction could be driven by the presence of labor in the denominator of both the 
dependent variable and the interaction so we re-estimated without normalizing any of the variables by labor. The US interaction 
with IT was still significantly different from the non US multinational interaction with IT (p-value = 0.040). See also the results in 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007).   22 
year (=0.22×3.7 percent). IT intensive industries account for about half of aggregate employment 
so that this higher coefficient – if applied to the US economy – would imply that aggregate US 
labor productivity would rise at about 0.4 percent a year faster than in Europe (= 0.5×0.81) 
between 1995 and 2004. Since actual US labor productivity growth over this period was at least 
0.8  percent  higher than in Europe, this coefficient would  suggest that about half of the US 
productivity miracle was related to the stronger relationship between productivity and IT in the 
US than in Europe.  
 
B. Robustness Tests of the production function results 
Table 3 presents a series of tests showing the robustness of the main results - we focus on the 
fixed effects specification, which is the most demanding, and on the IT intensive sectors, which 
we have shown to be crucial in driving our result. The first column represents our baseline 
production function results from column (7) in Table 2. The results are similar if we use value-
added-based specifications (see column (2)), so we stay with the more general specification using 
gross output as the dependent variable. 
Transfer Pricing and mark-ups - Since we are using multinational data, could transfer 
pricing be a reason for the results we obtain? If US firms shifted more of their accounting profits 
to the UK than other multinationals this could cause us to overestimate their productivity. But 
this would suggest that the factor coefficients on other inputs, particularly on materials, would 
also be systematically different for US establishments  (see the discussion on establishment-
specific prices above). To test this, column (3) estimates the production function with a full set of 
interactions between the US multinational dummy and all the factor inputs (and the non US 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
27 At the overall sample mean of IT intensity, the implied productivity premium of US multinationals over non US multinationals 
is 2.6 percent, but this rises to 5.0 percent when evaluated at the IT intensity of the average US multinational establishment.   23 
multinational dummy and all the factor inputs). None of the additional non  IT factor input 
interactions are individually significant, and the joint test at the bottom of the column of the 
additional interactions shows that they are jointly  insignificant
28.  We cannot reject the 
specification of equation (4) in column (1) as a good representation of the data versus the more 
general interactive models of column (3)
29
As a second test of differential mark-ups we follow Klette and Griliches (1996) and De 
Loecker (2007) by controlling for four-digit industry output (disaggregated by ownership type). 
The estimated mark-ups (inverse elasticities of demand) were significantly higher for 
multinationals than domestic firms, but the US multinationals did not have significantly higher 
mark-ups than non multinationals (p-value of difference = 0.404). More importantly, the US IT 
coefficient remained significantly greater than the non US multinational coefficient (p-value of 
difference = 0.010)
. This experiment also rejects the general idea that the 
productivity advantage of the US is attributable to differential mark-ups, because then we would 
expect to see significantly different coefficients on all  the factor inputs, not just on the IT 
variable. 
30
Mismeasurement of IT capital stock? - One concern is that we may be underestimating the 
true IT stock of US multinationals and this could generate a positive coefficient on the interaction 
term,  because of greater measurement error for the US establishments. For example, US 
multinationals may pay lower prices for IT than non US multinationals. To tackle this issue we 
turn to an alternative IT survey (the E-commerce Survey, see Appendix A) that has data on the 
proportion of workers in the establishment who are using computers. This is a pure “stock” 
. 
                                                            
28 For example, the joint test of the all the US interactions except the IT interaction has a p-value of 0.62. 
29 The p-value = 0.38 on this test. We also investigated whether the coefficients in the production function regressions differ by 
ownership type and sector (IT intensive or not). Running the six separate regressions (three ownership types by two sectors) we 
found that the F-test rejected at the 1 percent level the pooling of the US multinationals with the other firms in the IT intensive   24 
measure so it is unaffected by the initial conditions concern
31
Functional Forms - We tried including a much broader set of interactions and higher 
order terms (a “translog” specification) but these were generally individually  insignificant. 
Column (5) shows the results of including all the pair-wise interactions of materials, labor, IT 
capital, and non IT capital and the square of each of these factors. The additional terms are jointly 
significant but the key US interaction with the IT term remains basically unchanged (it falls 
slightly from 0.0368 in the baseline specification to 0.0334) and remains significant.  
. In column (4) we replace our IT 
capital stock measure with a measure of the computers per worker. Reassuringly, we still find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the US interaction with computer usage.  
Stronger selection effects for US multinationals because of greater distance from the UK? 
-  A further issue is that US firms may be more productive in the UK because the US  is 
geographically further away than the average non US multinational (in our data most foreign 
multinationals are European if they are not American). This would generate a strong US selection 
bias if only the most productive firms are able to overcome the greater fixed costs of distance. To 
test this we divide the non US multinational dummy into European versus non European firms. 
Under the distance argument, the non European firms would have to be more productive to be 
able to set up greenfield establishments in the UK. According to column (6) however, the IT 
coefficient for the US multinationals is significantly higher than the IT coefficient for the non 
European multinationals (p-value = 0.012), as well as higher than the IT coefficient on the 
European multinationals. Again, it is the US multinationals that appear to be different. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
sectors. In the non IT intensive sectors, by contrast, the pooling restrictions were not rejected. Details are available from the 
authors on request. 
30 See Appendix Table A7. 
31 Our IT capital stock measure is theoretically more appropriate as it is built analogously to the non IT stock and is comparable to 
best practice existing work. The E-Commerce Survey is available for three years (2001 to 2003), but the vast majority of the 
sample is observed only for one period, so we do not control for fixed effects.   25 
Industry heterogeneity - We allow for industry heterogeneity by including fixed effects, 
industry dummies interacted with time dummies and estimating separately for IT using sectors. 
We also considered further heterogeneity of the IT coefficients by estimating the production 
functions separately by each two digit and three-digit industry, but did not find much further 
systematic heterogeneity
32. For example, in the two digit estimations 70 percent of the IT using 
sectors had positive US*ln(C/L)  interactions compared to only 42  percent  of the “non  IT 
sectors”
33
One experiment was to estimate separately for the retail and wholesale sector, which have 
been large contributors to faster US  productivity growth since 1995. For these 3,846 
observations, the coefficient on the US*ln(C/L) interaction is 0.0413 with a standard error of 
0.0208
.  
34. In the remaining IT intensive sectors outside retail/wholesale the coefficient on the 
US*ln(C/L) interaction is 0.0347 with a standard error of 0.0181. Consequently, our results are 
not simply driven by the retail and wholesale sector
35
Controlling for endogenous inputs – We are also concerned about the endogeneity of the 
factor inputs attributable to unobserved transitory shocks. It is worth noting, however, that for 
endogeneity to rationalize our empirical results this would need to arise: (i) only for IT capital 
and not the other factor inputs; (ii) only  for US multinationals; and  (iii)  only  in the sectors 
. 
                                                            
32 We also estimated production functions separately for the IT producing sectors (see Appendix Table A1). We could not reject 
that these could be pooled with the non IT intensive sectors when estimating the baseline specification (p-value = 0.619).   
33 Furthermore, the only significantly negative interactions between IT and the US multinational dummy were for some non IT 
using sectors. See Appendix Table A8. 
34  This is reassuring as manipulating the transfer prices of intermediate inputs is more difficult in retail/wholesale than in 
manufacturing, as intermediate inputs generally are purchased from independent suppliers. 
35 See columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A9. Another possible explanation for the apparently higher productivity of IT is 
that US multinationals may be disproportionately represented in specific industries in which the output elasticity of IT is 
particularly high. The interaction of IT capital with the US dummy then would capture omitted industry characteristics rather than 
a “true” effect linked to US ownership. To test for this, we include in our regression as an additional control the percentage of US 
multinationals in the specific four-digit industry and its interaction with IT. The interaction was positive, but statistically 
insignificant, and the coefficient on the US*ln(C/L) interaction remains significant and largely unchanged with a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.035 (0.015).   26 
responsible for the US productivity miracle. Such a bias is possible, of course, but it is not 
obvious what alternative hypothesis would induce exactly these types of correlations.  
Nevertheless, we re-estimated the production functions using a version of the Olley-Pakes 
estimator (1996) that allows for two observable capital stocks, IT and non IT (a straightforward 
extension of the basic model as discussed in Ackerberg et al. 2008). We also used the “System 
GMM” estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) which relies on a different set of 
identification assumptions to address the endogeneity of the factor inputs. These estimators are 
discussed in Appendix C with the results presented in Appendix Table C1. In both cases the main 
finding - that the output-elasticity of IT for US multinationals is much larger than the output-
elasticity of IT for non US multinationals - is robust, even though the coefficients are estimated 
less precisely than under our baseline within-groups estimates
36
Multiple establishments belonging to the same parent – some establishments may belong 
to the same multinational (or domestic) corporation, even at a point of time. As a robustness test 
we allowed the standard errors to be clustered at this higher level, with little difference to the 
results (e.g. the p-value on the test of the difference in the US*ln(C/L) interaction effects was 
0.004). We also collapsed the data to this higher level of aggregation and re-estimated which 
again gave similar results.
.  
37
Unmeasured software inputs for US establishments - Could the US*ln(C/L) interaction 
reflect greater unmeasured software inputs for US establishments? Although this is certainly 
possible when we compare US multinationals with domestic establishments it is less likely when 
 This is unsurprising as 84 percent of the observations were single-
firm establishments. 
                                                            
36 The coefficient on the US*ln(C/L) interaction in the GMM system estimator is 0.0524 with a standard error of 0.0192 and this 
is significantly different from the non US multinational interaction at the 10 percent level. The underlying theoretical model of 
Olley-Pakes does not allow us to simply include interactions, so we estimated the production function separately for the three 
ownership types (US multinationals, non US multinationals and domestic UK establishments). The output-IT elasticity for US 
multinationals is twice as large as that of non US multinationals.   27 
we compare US multinationals with non US multinationals because a priori there is no reason to 
believe that they have higher levels of software. It could, however, be a problem if US firms were 
globally larger than other multinationals (software has a large fixed cost component so will be 
cheaper per unit for larger firms than smaller firms). To address this issue, we included a measure 
of the “global size” of the multinational parent of our establishments. In our UK ABI data, US 
and non US multinationals are similar in their median global employment size. As a more direct 
test, we introduce an explicit interaction term between the global size of the parent firm (defined 
as the log of the total number of worldwide employees) and IT capital in a specification identical 
to baseline specification in column (1) of Table 3. The interaction between global size and IT is 
insignificant and the US interaction with IT remained significant (at the 1 percent level) and 
significantly different from the non US multinational interaction with IT at the 10 percent level
38. 
So this does not appear to support a large role for software inputs  driving the superior US 
productivity of IT
39
[Table 4 about here] 
. Nevertheless, to address this issue more directly we will use explicit 
measures of management practices in Section IV. 
C. Estimation of the IT Intensity Equation 
Table 4 examines the regressions where the dependent variable is IT intensity (the log of the IT 
capital stock per worker). Column (1) shows that IT intensity is significantly higher in US firms 
than in both domestic firms and non US multinationals as was already suggested by Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
37 For example, the coefficient (standard error) on the key US and IT interaction in column (1) of Table 3 was 0.0456 (0.183).  
38 The global size variable was only available for a sub-sample of 2,205 observations (from the baseline sample of 7,784). When 
we re-ran the baseline specification on this smaller sub-sample, the US interaction with IT was 0.042 (instead of 0.037 in the 
baseline) and significant at the 1 percent level. When we include the global size term the point estimate rose to 0.043 (the point 
estimate on the global size*IT interaction was -0.0015, insignificant at conventional levels). See Appendix Table A9, column (5). 
39 We also used a measure of software capital constructed analogously to our main IT capital variable (see Appendix A). In our 
data, software expenditure includes a charge for software acquired from the multinational’s parent. The IT capital interaction is 
robust to the inclusion of this measure of software capital (and its interaction with ownership status). For example, when we 
added software capital to a specification identical to column (1) of Table 4 the standard IT interaction with the US remained 
positive and significant. In the pan-European database in the next section we have explicit measures of software applications such 
as ERP and Databases and also find our results robust to using these measures of software.   28 
Column (2) presents the same regression for the sectors which intensively use IT and column (3) 
for the other sectors. The difference between US and non US multinationals is significant at the 
10 percent level for the IT using industries, but insignificant for the other sectors. The last three 
columns repeat the specifications but include a longer list of controls. The same pattern emerges: 
US firms are more IT intensive, especially in the IT using sectors. 
Our estimates of the production function and IT demand equation generates the same 
finding – US firms appear to have some advantage in their use of IT as revealed both by the 
higher coefficient on IT in the production function and their greater usage of IT capital. 
 
D. US Multinational Takeovers of UK Establishments 
One concern with our empirical  strategy is that US  firms may “cherry pick” the best UK 
establishments. In other words, it is not the US multinational’s management that generates a 
higher IT coefficient but rather that American firms systematically take over UK establishments 
with higher output-IT elasticities.  To look at this issue,  we examined the sub-sample of 
establishments that were, at some point in our sample period, taken over by another firm in the IT 
intensive sectors. We considered both US and non US acquirers
40
Note that the identification assumption here is not that establishments that are taken over 
are the same as establishments that are not taken over. We condition on a sample of 
establishments who are all taken over at some point in the sample period. Thus, we assume that 
US multinationals are not systematically taking over establishments that are more productive in 
their use of IT than non US multinationals. We can empirically test this assumption by examining 
the characteristics - such as the IT level, IT growth and IT productivity - of establishments who 
.  
                                                            
40 We have a larger number of observations “post-takeover” than “pre-takeover” as there was a takeover wave at the beginning of 
our sample in the late 1990s associated with the stock market bubble and high tech boom. For these establishments, we   29 
will be taken over by US multinationals in the pre-takeover period relative to non  US 
multinationals. We will show that there is no evidence of such positive selection
41
In column (1) of Table 5, we start by estimating our standard production functions, for all 
establishments that are eventually taken over in their pre-takeover years (this is labelled “before 
takeover”). The coefficients on the observable factor inputs are similar to those for the whole 
sample in column (2) of Table 3. Unlike the full sample, though, the US and non US ownership 
dummies are insignificant, suggesting that the establishments taken over by multinationals are 
not ex ante more productive than those acquired by domestic UK firms. 
. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In column (2)  of Table 5 we interact the IT capital stock with a US and a non  US 
multinational ownership dummy, again estimated on the pre-takeover data. We see that neither 
interaction is significant – that is before establishments are taken over by US firms they do not 
have unusually high IT coefficients. So, US firms also do not appear to be selecting 
establishments that already provide higher IT productivity. In column (3) we estimate production 
function  specifications identical to columns (1) but on the post-takeover  sample.  The US 
multinational ownership coefficient  has now moved from being negative in the pre-takeover 
period to being positive, implying a change in productivity of 10.1 percent. By contrast the non 
US multinational coefficient hardly changes (it actually falls by 2 percent).  
Column (4) is the post-takeover version of column (2) where we allow the coefficient on 
IT to differ by ownership status. As in the earlier results of Table 2, the interaction between IT 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
necessarily have a lot more post takeover information than pre-takeover information. We drop takeovers which resulted in no 
change of ownership status (e.g. a US multinational taking over another US multinational subsidiary – see Appendix A). 
41 If US multinationals have higher IT productivity why do we not observe some systematic selection of US firms taking over 
particular UK establishments? We show there is some weak evidence of negative selection which is consistent with a simple 
model (discussed below and in Appendix B) of international transfer of management practices with a fixed costs. It is likely this 
incentive is small in magnitude compared to the many other causes of international merger and acquisitions. Statistically, the only 
variable which was significant in a takeover model was size: US multinationals were more likely to take over larger plants than 
non US multinationals. IT and other factors were insignificant.    30 
and US ownership is positive and significant at the 5 percent level (and is significantly different 
from the IT coefficient of non  US multinationals at the 10  percent  level). The test of the 
difference of the US*ln(C/L) interaction before and after the takeover is significant at the 10 
percent level (p-value=0.097)
42
The fifth column of Table 5 breaks down the post takeover period into the first year after 
the takeover and the subsequent years
.  
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The sample in Table 5 includes some multinational firms that are taken over by domestic 
UK firms, so a stronger test is to drop these observations  and consider only takeovers  by 
multinational firms. In column (6) we replicate the specification of column (5) for this smaller 
sample and again find that establishments taken over by US multinationals have a significantly 
higher coefficient on IT capital after two or more years than non multinational takeovers. 
. The greater productivity of IT capital in establishments 
taken over by US multinationals is revealed only two and three years after takeover (this 
interaction is significant at the 5  percent  level whereas the interaction in  the first year is 
insignificant). This is consistent with the idea that US firms take some time to reorganize before 
obtaining higher productivity gains from IT. Domestic and other multinationals again reveal no 
pattern, with all the dummies and interactions remaining insignificant. 
Although there is no evidence that US firms are “cherry picking” the better UK 
establishments, it is noticeable that the point estimates in column (1) and (2) are consistent with 
the idea that US firms may select the UK establishments that have lower IT coefficients in the 
production function, a form of negative selection. Although these point estimates are statistically 
insignificant, negative selection is consistent with a model where US firms are able to transfer 
                                                            
42 We examined whether the US productivity advantage was because they were more aggressive at closing down less efficient 
establishments. Foster, Haltiwanger and C.J. Krizan (2006), show that almost all aggregate US retail labor productivity growth in 
their sample is through this type of restructuring. In our data, although multinationals did close down more establishments post-
takeover than domestic takeovers, American firms did not seem to do this significantly more than other multinationals.   31 
their management practices to the plants they acquire. If this transfer has an element of fixed 
disruption cost, US firms will have a greater incentive to reorganize firms after takeover and so 
will be more willing to purchase badly managed firms that they can “turnaround”. Appendix B 
discusses an extension to our basic model that has this feature. 
 
IV. Firm-level Panel Data from Seven European Countries 
A disadvantage of the UK establishment level panel is that it does not contain direct information 
on management practices. To remedy this we constructed a second panel dataset across seven 
European countries that combined three main sources: the Center for Economic Performance 
(CEP) management survey, the Harte-Hanks IT panel and the Amadeus database of firm 
accounts.  
The CEP management survey - In the summer of 2006 a team of 51 interviewers ran a 
management practices survey from the CEP in London on 4,003 firms across Europe, the US and 
Asia. In this  paper we use data on the 1,633 firms from seven European countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK). Appendix A provides a detailed data 
description for the full sample, but we summarize relevant details here.   
The management data was collected using the survey tool developed in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007). This survey collects information on 18 questions grouped into four broad areas of 
management practices. In this paper we focus on the four people management questions covering 
promotions, rewards, hiring and fixing/firing bad performers. The reason for this focus is because 
of the case study and econometric evidence that effective use of IT requires changing several 
elements of the way that people are managed. First, there is an abundance of empirical evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
43 Note that throughout the table we drop the takeover year itself as we cannot determine the exact timing within the year when 
the takeover occurred.   32 
that IT is on average skill biased and requires shedding less skilled workers, hiring more skilled 
workers and re-training incumbent workers. In addition to this skill upgrading, IT  enabled 
improvements usually require more worker flexibility inside the firm with workers taking on new 
roles. Secondly, some theoretical work emphasizes that when there is uncertainty over how best 
to use a new technology, giving more discretion to employees with higher powered rewards may 
be a way to efficiently exploit their private knowledge. Canice Prendergast (2002) emphasized 
that higher powered incentives (such as output-based remuneration rather than flat-rate salary) 
may be more common when the principal has uncertainty over what tasks an agent should be 
performing. Daron Acemoglu et al. (2007) argue that delegation becomes more attractive when 
there is uncertainty about the best way to use a new technology.  
To operationalize these ideas we focus on four questions designed to pick up managerial 
attention to fixing/firing under  performers, aggressively promoting higher effort/ability 
employees (rather than just using tenure), offering higher powered incentives to employees and 
management effort in hiring talent. The questions emphasize the management of human capital 
similarly to the questions used by Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). We also present 
robustness tests looking at other forms of management and organization (such as lean techniques, 
target-setting and monitoring) and show that it is really people management that seems to matter 
for IT. 
Firms are scored from a 1 to 5 basis on each question, with the scores then normalized 
into z-scores using the complete sample
44 so the questions can be aggregated together. Although 
it is plausible that higher scores reflect “better” management, we do not assume this. All we 
claim is that American firms have, on average,  different  people management practices than 
European firms, and these types of practices are complementary with IT. The survey uses a   33 
double-blind technique to try and obtain unbiased accurate responses to the management survey 
questions. One part of this double-blind methodology is that managers were not told they were 
being scored during the telephone survey. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s 
evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions 
or the interviewer’s impressions. To run this “blind” scoring we introduced the exercise as an 
interview about management practices, using open questions (i.e. “can you tell me how you 
promote your employees”), rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your employees on 
tenure [yes/no]?”). Furthermore, these questions target actual practices and examples, with the 
discussion continuing until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical 
practices based on these examples. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) present extensive tests of the 
reliability of these management measures and their robustness to many different forms of 
psychological bias
45
The Harte-Hanks establishment level IT Panel - We use an establishment level IT data 
panel that comes from the European Ci Technology Database (CiDB) produced by the marketing 
and information company Harte-Hanks (H-H)
. 
46
                                                                                                                                                                                            
44 The scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the sample of 4,003 firms. 
. The H-H data has been collected annually for 
over 160,000 establishments across 14 European countries since the mid-1990s. They target all 
firms with 100 or more employees, obtaining about a 45 percent response rate. We use the data 
only for the firms we matched to those in the management survey (i.e. in France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK). Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2003) and Chris Forman, Avi Goldfarb and Shane Greenstein (2009) among others 
45 An alternative and complementary way to measuring management is the “organizational capital” approach of Carol Corrado, 
Charles Hulten and Sichel (2005). This follows the approach of cumulating inputs (such as managerial time) analogously to the 
way we construct the IT capital stock for the UK establishment data.  
46 H-H is a multinational that collects IT data primarily for the purpose of selling on to large producers and suppliers of IT. The 
fact that H-H sells this data on to major firms like IBM and Cisco exerts a strong market discipline on the data quality. Major 
discrepancies in the data are likely to be rapidly picked up when H-H customers’ sales force placed calls using the survey data.   34 
have also previously used the US H-H data, typically matching the US data to a sub-sample of 
large publicly quoted firms in Compustat.  
The H-H survey contains detailed hardware, equipment and software information at the 
establishment level. We focus on using computers (PCs plus laptops) per worker as our key 
measure of IT intensity because this is available for all the establishments and is measured in a 
comparable way across time and countries. This computer per worker measure of IT has also 
been used by other papers in the micro-literature on technological change (e.g. Paul Beaudry, 
Doms and Ethan Lewis 2006) and is highly correlated with other measures of IT use like the 
firm’s total IT capital stock per worker
47
The AMADEUS firm-level Accounts Panel - The AMADEUS accounts database provides 
company accounts on essentially the population of public and private firms in Europe. It has 
information for most companies on sales, employment and fixed-assets, and has been used in 
previous papers to estimate production functions (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007 and de 
Loecker, 2007). AMADEUS is constructed primarily from the mandatory national registries of 
companies.  
. We aggregate across establishments to form an estimate 
of the firm-level number of computers per worker.   
The combined European firm-level panel dataset - We match 720 of the firms in our 
management survey to the H-H data and accounting data. There  appeared to be no sample 
selection bias in comparing US vs. non US multinationals (see Appendix A). In particular, better 
managed firms and more productive firms were no more likely to be in the IT sub-sample 
compared to the rest of the CEP survey. We estimate our regressions over the years 1999 to 2006. 
Panel C of Table A2 presents some descriptive statistics. As with the UK establishment database, 
                                                            
47  For example, in our establishment level data a regression of ln(IT capital stock per employee) on the ln(proportion of 
employees using computers) gives a coefficient of 0.63.   35 
compared to other multinationals, US multinationals are larger, more productive and have higher 
IT intensity. They also tend to have better people management scores (see next section). We also 
have information on the proportion of college educated workers which is also higher in the US 
than elsewhere. Consequently, as a robustness check for technology-skill complementarity, we 
control for human capital and its interaction with IT in some regressions.   
 
V. Results from a Cross-European Firm-level Panel 
The results so far suggest that US owned establishments have a higher elasticity of output with 
respect to IT, even after taking over existing establishments.  This implies there may be an 
unobserved factor that is more abundant in American firms and that is complementary with IT. In 
this section we explore the idea that people management practices constitute this previously 
unobserved factor and use our survey instrument to measure it. In the first sub-section we discuss 
some descriptive statistics and in the second sub-section we offer some econometric results 
consistent with our key hypothesis. 
 
A. People Management in US firms Compared to other Countries 
Before we present the results it is worth considering some supporting evidence on the different 
internal management of American firms compared to those in Europe and Asia. Remember that 
we choose these people management aspects because the econometric and case-study evidence 
suggest that these features of the firm are particularly important for effectively using IT, which 
frequently requires substantial changes in the way that employees work. 
In Figure 3, panels 3a and 3b provide new evidence on the people management scores of 
4,003 firms in the US, Asia and Europe. In Figure 3a, we see that firms based in the US have 
much higher scores than firms in other countries – about half a standard deviation on average. In   36 
Figure 3b we examine a sub-sample of the data, plotting the average people management scores 
of subsidiaries located in our seven European countries by multinational origin
48. Interestingly, 
the affiliates of US multinationals in Europe tend to have much higher people management scores 
than other countries. This is consistent with the idea that US firms are able to transfer some of 
their practices overseas to their subsidiary operations
49
[Table 6 and Figure 3 about here] 
. Local labor market regulations influence 
people management practices, but do not completely determine them. If they did, there would be 
no systematic difference in the management practices of US subsidiaries in Europe compared to 
other firms. 
B. Results 
Basic results- Table 6 contain the results from the European panel. In columns (1) to (6) we 
estimate the production function and in the final two columns the IT intensity equation. Column 
(1) estimates a basic productivity equation controlling only for capital, labor, ownership status 
and some basic controls (country dummies interacted with time dummies, three digit industry 
dummies and listing status). As with the UK establishment data, US multinational subsidiaries 
have higher measured total factor productivity than other multinationals (and domestic firms). 
The data is consistent with constant returns to scale (i.e. the coefficient on labor is insignificant). 
The point estimates are much larger than for the establishment level data because materials is not 
included as an explanatory variable as this is not available in most company accounts. If 
                                                            
48 A multinational source country had to have at least 25 subsidiaries in the sample to be included in the graph. 
49 The high people management ratings for some countries such as Germany may appear surprising given their high degree of 
labor market regulation. This arises because the average scores for management practices as a whole in Germany are high 
(although they are relatively higher in operations). Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) relate this to a combination of relatively high 
skill levels and few primo geniture family firms.    37 
materials are included the point estimates on the sub-sample look similar to those for the 
establishment level data
50
The second column of Table 6 uses the sub-sample of the data where we observe IT (i.e. 
the sample that overlaps with the H-H dataset). First we follow Table 2 and simply interact the 
ownership dummies with the IT measure. Exactly as we saw in the UK establishment panel the 
coefficient on IT is significantly higher for US multinationals compared to non US multinationals 
(and also to domestic firms). Column (3) replaces the multinational interactions with IT with our 
measures of people management practices and their interaction with IT intensity. As the model 
predicts, there is a positive and significant interaction between people management and IT 
intensity. Column (4) is the key column which includes both sets of interactions. We find that 
conditional on the management interactions, the coefficient on the interaction of IT and US 
ownership has dropped by more than half in magnitude and is now insignificantly different from 
zero. This is a key result: it suggests that the reason that we observed a higher coefficient on IT 
for US multinationals in column (2) was because: (i) they have higher levels of people 
management and (ii) there is a complementarity between IT and people management
. 
51
Column (5) of Table 6 repeats the specification from column (4) but now includes a full 
set of firm fixed effects. The pattern is broadly the same, although the precision of the estimates 
has fallen, as would be expected when we rely solely on within-firm variation
. 
52
                                                            
50 For example, including materials in column (1) specification reduces the sample size to 4,577 observations. The coefficient 
(standard-errors) on capital, US and non US multinational ownership, and materials were 0.1106 (0.0135), 0.1128 (0.0421), 
0.0574 (0.0220) and 0.5269 (0.0229) respectively. If computers are included in the regression, the coefficient (standard error) on 
this variable is 0.0254 (0.0185).  
. The interaction 
between IT and people management remains significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the 
51 If we drop the interactions and ownership variable, the people management score in levels is positively and significantly related 
to productivity at the 10 percent level: a coefficient of 0.039 with a standard error of 0.023. 
52 Note that the management and ownership status variables are cross sectional so the linear terms are absorbed by the fixed 
effects, even though their interaction with IT is still identified.   38 
coefficient on the interaction between IT and US ownership is now only 0.052 and completely 
insignificant.  
The final two columns of Table 6 present the regressions where IT intensity is the 
dependent variable. Column (7) shows that US firms are much more IT intensive than other 
multinationals and domestic firms. The people management variable also has a strong and 
positive correlation with IT intensity as shown in the column (8). In this final column the US 
coefficient falls from 0.260 to 0.215, indicating that part of the higher IT intensity in US 
multinationals is due to the higher levels of people management. 
Technology-skill complementarity  -  There is a large literature showing that new 
technologies are complementary with skills (e.g. David Autor, Larry Katz and Alan Krueger 
1998). If US firms have higher levels of skills, could this simply explain our results? Fortunately, 
the CEP management survey contained a measure of the proportion of employees with college 
degrees. We include this variable throughout Table 6 and find it to be consistently positive in the 
production function, as we would expect from basic human capital theory. In column (6) we also 
include the interaction of this human capital measure with IT. The IT*skills interaction enters 
with a positive but insignificant coefficient, but the management interaction with IT remains 
robust to this extra interaction. 
In the UK establishment panel the  main control for labor  quality  is  the inclusion of 
establishment-specific fixed effects as we have no direct measure of skill. As an alternative, we 
assume that wages reflect marginal products of workers, so that conditioning on the average wage 
in the establishment is sufficient to control for human capital
53
                                                            
53 The problem is that wages may control for “too much”, as some proportion of wages may be related to non human capital 
variables. For example, in many bargaining models, firms with high productivity will reward even homogenous workers with 
higher wages (for example, see Van Reenen 1996, on sharing the quasi-rents from new technologies). 
. When entered into a specification 
identical to that of column (1) of Table 3, the average wage is highly significant and the   39 
interaction between the average wage and IT capital is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
level, consistent with technology-skill complementarity. The interaction between the US dummy 
and average wages in the establishment is significant at the 10 percent level (a coefficient of 
0.0119 and a standard error of 0.0063). Nevertheless, even in the presence of these skills controls, 
the coefficient on the US ownership and IT interaction remains significantly positive (0.0279 
with a standard error of 0.0133). Consequently we do not believe that our results only reflect 
technology-skill complementarity. 
Other dimensions of management practice - We argued on ex ante grounds that people 
management was likely to be an organizational feature complementary to IT. In Table A5 we 
examine the interactions of IT with other aspects of management such as shopfloor operations, 
targets, monitoring and combinations across all 18 questions. Although these interactions are 
positive, none are significant or as strong as the people management interaction. 
Other confounding factors – We checked for a large number of other confounding factors 
that could be correlated with management practices and be driving the results on the interaction 
with IT. These included average hours worked, union strength, different types of software (e.g. 
Enterprise Resource Planning). Although these were systematically different in European and US 
firms, they did not change the IT and management results. 
So in summary, the evidence from the European panel has the same basic pattern of 
results we saw in the UK establishment panel. US firms appear to have some advantage in IT. 
The new piece of information is that this advantage appears to be linked with their superior 
people management practices that are complementary with IT and this explains the higher 
coefficient on IT for US firms observed in the earlier tables. 
 
VI. Conclusions   40 
Why did Europe not follow the American IT led productivity acceleration after 1995? We 
provide econometric evidence in line with the hypothesis that US people management practices 
were a reason for this difference as has been suggested by Blanchard (2004) and others. Using 
two rich micro-panels, we show robust evidence that US multinationals obtain higher 
productivity from IT than non  US multinationals (or domestic firms) in Europe. In the first 
dataset (of UK establishments), we found that the stronger association of IT with productivity for 
US firms is focused in the same “IT using intensive” industries, such as retail and wholesale, that 
largely accounted for the US productivity acceleration since the mid 1990s. These results were 
robust to examining establishments that were taken over by other firms: US firms who took over 
establishments have significantly greater IT productivity relative to non US multinationals who 
took over  statistically similar establishments.  In the second dataset of firms across seven 
European countries, we showed that US firms had higher levels of people management (which 
was complementary with IT) and this accounted for the American advantage in IT use. 
Taken together, this suggests that part of the IT related productivity gains underlying the 
post-1995 period is related to the management practices of US firms rather than simple natural 
advantage (geographical, institutional or otherwise) of being located in the US environment. US 
firms appear to have transplanted these management practices abroad, so that their overseas 
subsidiaries also enjoyed a productivity miracle. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that 
we can account for about half of the US-EU difference in productivity growth since 1995 using 
our estimates. 
There remain many outstanding issues and research questions. First, understanding what 
are the determinants of the heterogeneous management practices between firms, industries and 
nations is a vitally important question. Theory has out-run econometric work here, but this is 
currently an area of our active research.    41 
A second and related question is why do US firms have different people management 
practices from Europe? One result from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) is that US firms are 
“better managed” in general, because of the higher levels of competition in their domestic 
markets and the more limited involvement of primo geniture family firms. But US firms also 
appear to be particularly strong on people management. One reason seems to be the greater 
supply of human capital in the US. Across firms and industries the intensity of graduate-level 
employees is strongly associated with better people-management practices. Another reason seems 
to be lower levels of labor market regulation in the US: labor flexibility is significantly and 
positively correlated with better people-management across countries in our data.
54
This management gap also appears to be a long-standing phenomenon. For example, the 
Marshall Plan productivity mission of 1947 wrote: “Efficient management is the single most 
significant factor in the American productivity advantage”. This implies the US productivity 
surge was the effect of a rapid increase in IT intensity, driven by the accelerating fall in IT prices 
since 1995, which better suited US firms with their strong people management skills. The rate of 
decline of IT prices appears to have slowed since 2005 and this may have brought an end to the 
US productivity miracle. If this period is historically specific, then the wave of US takeovers in 
Europe may slow down or be reversed. Alternatively, if another wave of rapid technological 
change occurs then our results suggest that US firms may once again enjoy a period of 
accelerated productivity growth as their people management practices allow them to better 
exploit new technologies. 
 
                                                            
54 See Juan Botero et al. (2004) or Christopher Gust and Jaime Marquez (2004) on cross-country labor regulations. In our data we 
find a cross-country correlation of 0.71 between the World Bank index of employment flexibility and people management 
practices.   42 
A final remark is that our framework has implications for firms outside Europe. For 
example, we would expect to see the same US productivity advantage  in IT for American 
multinationals in the US (or indeed Asia) compared to non US multinationals.  
Despite this need for further research we believe our paper has made some inroads into 
one of the most puzzling episodes in the last two  decades: the explanation of the US 
“productivity miracle”.   43 
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TABLE 1 – UK DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BROKEN DOWN BY MULTINATIONAL STATUS 
(Normalized to 100 for the 3-digit SIC and year average) 
    Employment  Value added 
per Employee 
Gross output 
per Employee 
Non IT 
Capital per 
Employee 
Materials 
per Employee 
IT Capital 
per Employee 
US Multinationals               
  Mean  162.26  127.96  123.63  129.61  123.81  152.13 
  St. Deviation  297.58  163.17  104.81  133.91  123.35  234.41 
  Observations  569  569  569  569  569  569 
               
Other Multinationals               
  Mean  148.58  113.71  115.22  120.65  116.02  119.58 
  St. Deviation  246.35  107.87  86.50  126.83  107.63  180.34 
  Observations  2,119  2,119  2,119  2,119  2,119  2,119 
               
UK domestic               
  Mean  68.78  89.86  89.69  86.33  89.29  83.95 
  St. Deviation  137.72  104.50  102.09  127.16  129.37  188.30   52 
  Observations  4,433  4,433  4,433  4,433  4,433  4,433 
 
Notes: These are 2001 values from our sample of 7,121 establishments in the UK data (ABI matched with IT data from QICE, BSCI and FAR). 
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TABLE 2 – ESTIMATES OF THE UK PRODUCTION FUNCTION ALLOWING THE I.T. COEFFICIENT TO DIFFER BY OWNERSHIP 
STATUS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Output/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L) 
Sectors  All Sectors  All Sectors  All Sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other Sectors  All Sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other Sectors 
Fixed effects  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
USA*ln(C/L)      0.0202***  0.0380***  0.0120  0.0093  0.0368**  -0.0060 
USA ownership*IT capital per 
employee 
    (0.0072)  (0.0128)  (0.0084)  (0.0085)  (0.0144)  (0.0098) 
MNE*ln(C/L)      0.0036  -0.0011  0.0062  0.0010  -0.0003  0.0008 
Non US multinational *IT capital  
per employee 
    (0.0045)  (0.0062)  (0.0060)  (0.0042)  (0.0064)  (0.0053) 
ln(C/L)    0.0457***  0.0428***  0.0373***  0.0457***  0.0152***  0.0123**  0.0157*** 
IT capital per employee    (0.0024)  (0.0029)  (0.0038)  (0.0039)  (0.0030)  (0.0051)  (0.0036) 
ln(M/L)  0.5575***  0.5474***  0.5477***  0.6216***  0.5067***  0.4031***  0.5018***  0.3606*** 
Materials per employee  (0.0084)  (0.0083)  (0.0083)  (0.0142)  (0.0104)  (0.0178)  (0.0279)  (0.0210) 
ln(K/L)  0.1388***  0.1268***  0.1268***  0.1106***  0.1459***  0.0900***  0.1056***  0.0666*** 
Non IT Capital  per employee  (0.0071)  (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0093)  (0.0092)  (0.0159)  (0.0228)  (0.0209) 
ln(L)  -0.0052*  -0.0112***  -0.0111***  -0.0094**  -0.0121***  -0.1986***  -0.1279***  -0.2466*** 
Labor  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0037)  (0.0036)  (0.0217)  (0.0319)  (0.0279) 
USA  0.0711***  0.0641***  0.0733***  0.0440**  0.0892***  0.0214  0.0451  -0.0070 
USA Ownership  (0.0140)  (0.0135)  (0.0144)  (0.0213)  (0.0189)  (0.0224)  (0.0366)  (0.0242)   54 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of gross output per employee. The time period is 1995-
2003. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. Columns (6) to (8) include establishment level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients in all columns are clustered by 
establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies 
and as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and a dummy for IT 
survey. See online Table A1 for definition of IT using intensive sectors. “Test USA*ln(C/L)=MNE*ln(C/L)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C/L) is significantly different from the 
coefficient on MNE*ln(C/L). etc.   55 
TABLE 3 – ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF THE UK PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Experiment  Baseline 
Specification 
Value 
Added 
All Inputs 
Interacted  
Alternative 
IT measure 
Full 
“Translog” 
interactions 
EU and 
Non EU 
MNEs 
ln(Output per employee)  ln(Q/L)  ln(VA/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L) 
             
USA*ln(C/L)  0.0368**  0.0681**  0.0328**  0.0672**  0.0334**  0.0376*** 
USA ownership*IT capital per 
employee 
(0.0144)  (0.0319)  (0.0141)  (0.0258)  (0.0140)  (0.0145) 
MNE*ln(C/L)  -0.0003  -0.0179  0.0002  0.0070  -0.0012   
Non US multinational*IT capital 
per employee 
(0.0064)  (0.0166)  (0.0065)  (0.0126)  (0.0062)   
Ln(C/L)  0.0123**  0.0290***  0.0126**  0.0262***  0.0330  0.0120** 
IT capital per employee  (0.0051)  (0.0110)  (0.0050)  (0.0082)  (0.0460)  (0.0051) 
USA*ln(M/L)      0.0334       
USA ownership*materials per 
employee 
    (0.0376)       
MNE*ln(M/L)      0.0080       
Non US multinational *materials 
per employee 
    (0.0236)       
USA*ln(K/L)      0.0241       
USA ownership*Non IT capital 
per employee 
    (0.0368)       
MNE*ln(K/L)      -0.0142       
Non US *Non IT capital per 
employee 
    (0.0134)       
EU MNE            0.0063 
EU ownership            (0.0198) 
NON EU MNE            -0.0603 
Non EU-NON USA Ownership            (0.0489) 
EU MNE*ln(C/L)            0.0016 
EU ownership*IT Capital per            (0.0064)   56 
employee 
NON EU MNE*ln(C/L)            -0.0140 
Non EU-NON USA *IT capital 
per employee 
          (0.0157) 
Observations  7,784  7,784  7,784  2,155  7,784  7,784 
Test  
USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C), p-
value  0.0094  0.0103  0.0224  0.0216  0.0138   
Test  USA=MNE, p-value  0.4301  0.9638  0.3620  0.2244  0.3852   
Test on joint significance of 
all the interaction terms, 
excluding IT interactions (p-
value)      0.3752       
Test on joint significance of 
all the US interaction terms, 
excluding IT per employee 
(p-value)      0.6216       
Test on all the other MNE's  
interaction terms, excluding 
IT per employee (p-value)      0.2723       
Test on additional “translog” 
terms, p-value          0.0000   
Test  USA=EU, p-value            0.3216 
Test  USA=NON EU, p-value            0.0815 
Test  [USA*ln(C/L)] = 
[EU*ln(C/L)], p-value            0.0120 
Test  [USA*ln(C/L)] = [NON 
EU*ln(C/L)], p-value            0.0123 
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log of gross output per employee. All columns are for only the sectors that use IT intensively (see Appendix 
A1).  The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method is OLS. All columns also include (the log of) non IT capital per 
worker (K/L), materials per worker (M/L) and labor (L). All columns except (4) include establishment fixed effects. Standard 
errors in brackets under coefficients are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of   57 
unknown form). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies and 
as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing sector dummy), region,  multi-
establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey (except column (4)). The IT measure in column (4) is the 
ln(fraction of workers using computers). Column (5) includes all the pair-wise interactions of materials, labor, IT capital, and 
non IT capital and the square of each of these factors. “Test USA*ln(C/L) =MNE*ln(C/L)” is test of whether the coefficient 
on USA*ln(C/L) is significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C/L), etc.   58 
 
TABLE 4 – UK IT INTENSITY EQUATIONS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Dependent variable: ln(IT capita 
l per employee) 
ln(C/L)  ln(C/L)  ln(C/L)  ln(C/L)  ln(C/L)  ln(C/L) 
Sectors  All 
Sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other 
Sectors 
All 
Sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other 
Sectors 
             
USA  0.2629***  0.3393***  0.2085***  0.2406***  0.3129***  0.1927*** 
USA Ownership  (0.0461)  (0.0717)  (0.0600)  (0.0463)  (0.0717)  (0.0604) 
MNE  0.1632***  0.2117***  0.1332***  0.1506***  0.1939***  0.1228*** 
Non US multinational  (0.0287)  (0.0440)  (0.0375)  (0.0291)  (0.0452)  (0.0380) 
             
Additional controls  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  21,746  7,784  13,962  21,746  7,784  13,962 
                    
Test  USA=MNE, p-value  0.0310  0.0758  0.2108  0.0528  0.0970  0.2508 
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable in all 
columns is the log of IT capital per employee. The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. 
Standard errors in brackets under coefficients in all columns are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with a full 
set of time dummies and the log of gross output. Additional controls include dummies for establishment age (interacted with 
a manufacturing dummy), region, multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey. See online 
Table A1 for definition of IT using intensive sectors. “Test USA=MNE” is test of whether the coefficient on USA is 
significantly different from the coefficient on MNE.   59 
TABLE 5 – UK PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER TAKEOVERS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sample 
Before 
Takeover 
Before 
Takeover 
After 
Takeover 
After 
Takeover 
After 
Takeover 
After 
Takeover 
(drop UK  
domestic 
acquirers) 
Dependent Variable: ln(Output per employee)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L)  ln(Q/L) 
USA*ln(C/L)    -0.0672    0.0541**     
USA Takeover*IT capital per employee    (0.0749)    (0.0273)     
MNE*ln(C/L)    -0.0432    0.0073     
Non US multinational Takeover*IT capital per employee    (0.0463)    (0.0150)     
USA  -0.0661  -0.1055  0.0353  0.0619     
USA Takeover  (0.0663)  (0.0863)  (0.0402)  (0.0461)     
MNE  0.0321  -0.0009  0.0117  0.0205     
Non US multinational Takeover  (0.0565)  (0.0710)  (0.0298)  (0.0342)     
USA*ln(C/L) one year after takeover          0.0192  0.0191 
          (0.0378)  (0.0562) 
USA*ln(C/L) two and three years after  takeover          0.0661**  0.1303** 
          (0.0294)  (0.0573) 
MNE*ln(C/L)  one year after  takeover          -0.0091   
          (0.0197)   
MNE*ln(C/L) two and three years after  takeover          0.0115   
          (0.0162)   
USA one year after  takeover          0.0019  0.0014 
          (0.0542)  (0.0716) 
USA two and three years after  takeover          0.0934*  0.0942 
          (0.0485)  (0.0856) 
MNE one year after takeover          -0.0178   
          (0.0411)     60 
MNE two and three years after takeover          0.0327   
          (0.0361)   
ln(C/L)  0.0744**  0.0935**  0.0395***  0.0287***  0.0288***  0.0282 
IT capital per employee  (0.0299)  (0.0432)  (0.0079)  (0.0088)  (0.0088)  (0.0224) 
ln(M/L)  0.5486***  0.5487***  0.6871***  0.6892***  0.6886***  0.7323*** 
Materials per employee  (0.0489)  (0.0481)  (0.0173)  (0.0173)  (0.0172)  (0.0292) 
ln(K/L)  0.1759***  0.1718***  0.0350**  0.0350**  0.0353**  -0.0108 
Non IT Capital per employee  (0.0343)  (0.0335)  (0.0160)  (0.0159)  (0.0159)  (0.0431) 
ln(L)  -0.0185  -0.0215  -0.0117  -0.0111  -0.0112  -0.0358* 
Labor  (0.0292)  (0.0276)  (0.0108)  (0.0108)  (0.0107)  (0.0213) 
Observations  261  261  1,006  1,006  1,006  241 
Test USA*ln(C/L) = MNE*ln(C/L), p-value    0.7037    0.0965     
Test USA = MNE, p-value  0.1637  0.1773  0.5979  0.4056     
Test  (USA one year)*ln(C/L) =           0.4948   
(MNE one year)*ln(C/L), p-value             
Test (USA two plus years)*ln(C/L) =           0.0734   
(MNE two plus years)*ln(C/L), p-value             
Test USA one year = MNE one year, p-value          0.7463   
Test USA two plus years = MNE two plus years, p-value          0.2481   
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The sample is all establishments in the IT 
intensive sectors (online Table A1) who were taken over at some point (omitted base is “domestic takeovers” – a UK firms taking other 
another firm). We drop takeovers that do not result in a change of ownership category (e.g. US takeovers of US firms, non US MNE 
takeovers of non US MNEs and domestic takeovers of domestic firms). The dependent variable is the log of gross output per employee. 
The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients are clustered by 
establishment. A takeover is defined as a change in the establishment foreign ownership marker or - for UK domestic establishment - as a 
change in the enterprise group marker.  The "before" period is defined as the interval between one and three years before the takeover 
takes place.  The "after" period is defined as the interval between one and three years after the takeover takes place. The year in which the 
takeover takes place is excluded from the sample. All columns include a full set of two digit industry dummies interacted with time 
dummies and as additional controls: age, region dummies, a multi-establishment group dummy, an IT survey dummy and controls for 
total takeover activity over the sample period. “Test USA*ln(C/L) =MNE*ln(C/L)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C/L) is 
significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C/L), etc.   61 
TABLE 6 - EUROPEAN FIRM-LEVEL PANEL DATA WITH DIRECT MEASURES OF 
MANAGEMENT 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(Q/L)  Ln(C/L)  Ln(C/L) 
Fixed Effects  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO 
USA*ln(C/L)    0.1790**    0.0784  0.0518  0.0192     
USA ownership*Computers per 
employee 
  (0.0733)    (0.0720)  (0.0713)  (0.0785)     
MNE*ln(C/L)    -0.0263    -0.0235  0.0218  0.0235     
Non US multinational*Computers 
per employee 
  (0.0586)    (0.0553)  (0.0547)  (0.0550)     
People Management      0.0271  0.0271        0.1268*** 
People management      (0.0219)  (0.0219)        (0.0353) 
People 
Management*ln(C/L)      0.1451***  0.1404***  0.1284*  0.0994*     
People management*Computers 
per employee 
    (0.0331)  (0.0344)  (0.0773)  (0.0581)     
ln (K/L)  0.2401***  0.1838***  0.1782***  0.1791***  0.2347**  0.2316***     
Non IT Capital per employee  (0.0163)  (0.0284)  (0.0276)  (0.0276)  (0.0926)  (0.0882)     
ln(L)  -0.0182  0.0421  0.0421  0.0409  -0.2182  -0.2347     
Labor  (0.0162)  (0.0360)  (0.0344)  (0.0349)  (0.2600)  (0.2497)     
ln(C/L)    0.1256***  0.1430***  0.1463***  -0.0493  -0.2282     
Computers per employee    (0.031)  (0.0284)  (0.0303)  (0.0596)  (0.1738)     
USA  0.2548***  0.0779  0.1111**  0.0837*      0.2601***  0.2150*** 
USA Ownership  (0.0438)  (0.0481)  (0.0446)  (0.046)      (0.0742)  (0.0732) 
MNE  0.1909***  0.1597***  0.1604***  0.1618***      0.0492  0.0367 
Non US multinational  (0.0304)  (0.0363)  (0.0355)  (0.0357)      (0.0596)  (0.0591) 
ln(Degree)    0.0433**  0.0375**  0.0370**      0.0585**  0.0359 
Percentage employees with a 
college degree 
  (0.0183)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)      (0.0293)  (0.0296) 
ln(Degree)*ln(C/L)            0.0700       62 
Percentage employees with a 
college degree*Computers per 
employee 
          (0.0484)     
Observations  9,463  2,555  2,555  2,555  2,555  2,555  2,555  2,555 
Test  USA*ln(C/L)= 
MNE*ln(C/L), p-value    0.0189    0.2419  0.6360  0.9565     
Test  USA=MNE, p-value  0.1789  0.1206  0.3094  0.1264      0.0095  0.0253 
                 
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable in all 
columns (1) to (6) is the log of sales per employee, and in columns (7) and (8) is the log of computers per employee. The 
time period is 1999-2006, containing data from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The 
estimation method in all columns is OLS. Columns (5) and (6) include firm level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets 
under coefficients in all columns are clustered by firm (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies, country dummies interacted with a full set of time 
dummies and a public listing indicator. Columns (2) to (8) are weighted by the survey coverage rate in the Harte-Hanks data, 
plus include a 5th order Taylor expansion for the coverage ratio to control for any potential survey bias. “Test 
USA*ln(C/L)=MNE*ln(C/L)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C/L) is significantly different from the coefficient 
on MNE*ln(C/L), etc. 720 firms in all columns except column (1) where there are 1,828 firms. 
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Figure 1: Output per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
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Notes: Productivity measured by GDP per hour in 2005
US $ PPPs. The countries included in the “EU 15” group
are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Netherlands. Labor
productivityper hour worked in 2005 US$.
Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth
andDevelopment Centre, Total Economy Database.
Figure 2: IT capital per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
Notes: IT capital stock (in unit dollars) per hour worked.
IT capital stock measured using perpetual inventory
method and common assumptions on hedonics and
depreciation. 2005 US $ PPPs The countries included in
the “EU 15” group are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
Netherlands. Labour productivity per hour worked in
2005 US$ using PPPs. Source: Marcel P. Timmer, Gerard
Ypma and Bart van Ark, “IT in the European Union:
Driving Productivity Convergence?”, Research
Memorandum GD-67, Groningen Growth and
Development Centre, October 2003, Appendix Tables,
updated June 2005.
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Figure 2: IT capital per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURES 3A & 3B 
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Figure 3a: People management z-scores,
all firms by country of location
Notes: In Figures 3a and 3b the “People management z-score” is the average z-score score for the 4 management practices on people management, covering “Managing
human capital”, “Rewarding high performance”, “Removing poor performers” and “Promoting high performers”. This is normalized to have a firm level standard
deviation of 1. The sample in Figure 3a is all 4,003 firms sorted according to country of location. The sample in Figure 3b is the subset of 631 multinational subsidiaries
located in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, sorted accorded to countryof origin and only plotted for origin countries with at least 25 firms in
thesample.
Figure 3b: People management z-scores,
multinationals by country of origin
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